How to Prevent Name Squatting
Allocating globally unique names while providing a seamless user experience is an epic challenge. People hate it when the name they want has been taken by someone who isn’t using it. They equally hate it when someone buys thousands of names cheaply and then attempts to sell them at a premium price. What is even worse is when someone takes the name you have been using for decades, a name you made valuable, and then tries to sell it to you at a premium price.
There are two primary ways to ration names: economically or politically. When you ration names economically the complaint is all the “good” names are taken and are extremely expensive. When you ration names politically you need a consensus process which becomes a potential point of community conflict. Navigating a political process is not cheap nor easy.
How do we get our names anyway? You either declare to the world what you want to be called or the world chooses what to call you. This creates a point of conflict when two people both want to be called the same thing. There is also a conflict when “everyone knows” the proper name but proving what “everyone knows” in an objective manner is challenging.
Early on in any business you have to keep your ideas for names a “secret” until you have secured your domain names and social media handles. If anyone gets wind of names you are merely considering then they might claim that name before you on as many platforms as possible and then extort you to use it. The only defense is to preemptively register any name you think you might use before you share your thoughts with anyone. This only compounds the problem of good names being “taken” but unused and unavailable.
A name allocation system should aim to make the maximum number of names available as possible while mitigating the risk that someone will engage in squatting or front running.
All names start out in the “public commons” and name-squatting is an example of the tragedy of the commons. Short names are scarce real estate because there are far fewer quality short names than there are people and businesses that would like to use them. When someone claims a name they are simultaneously denying it to everyone else. Ideally, everyone who loses the opportunity to use the name should be compensated by the person who gets to claim the name. Name-squatting is effectively theft from the public commons because the squatter buys the name cheap and then attempts to resell the name at fair market prices.
The solution to name-squatting is to allocate all names at a price as close to fair market value as possible. This removes the profit margin of the squatter and ensures that everyone has an equal opportunity to claim a name by reimbursing the broader community. Unfortunately, this is not popular among people who want names to be allocated on a first-come, first-serve basis for a cheap price.
In theory, using an auction to discover the price of a name works; however, this assumes that all future potential buyers are aware of the auction and ready to participate. If you attempted to auction every possible name at the same time, then the vast majority would sell for a fraction of a cent to a name squatter. This is because the future real user for the name is not in the market at the time of the auction.
In order to prevent name squatting, the rate at which names are allocated needs to match as closely as possible the “natural” rate of claiming names for legitimate (non-squatting) purposes. Allocating names faster than real demand will suppress the price and create opportunities for squatters. Allocating names slower than real demand will push prices higher than necessary and hinder growth.
Unfortunately, no one knows what the “natural” rate of name allocation is and it is something that is not constant. You can have a surge of new users one week, then nothing for a month. Static rate-limiting of name allocation can frustrate adoption during the surge and still enable squatting opportunities during slow periods.
EOS Premium Name Algorithm
The EOS network attempted to prevent name squatting by auctioning preimum names. The shorter the name, the rarer it is. Short names can be used to create namespaces, like “.com” and businesses can buy a short name in order to allocate all names with the same ending. This allows the Anchor wallet to sell premium “.gm” names without users having to go through the auction process.
The way the algorithm works is that at most one premium name can be sold per day and it must be the most expensive of all premium names currently pending and it must have maintained the top spot for 24 hours. In the event of a bidding war, the rate of premium name allocation might slow down and take a week or more.
Many people don’t like this algorithm because it takes an unpredictable amount of time and is very expensive. In theory, it could take just 24 hours to get the name you want… if you are willing to pay much more than everyone else in order to jump to the front of the queue.
One benefit of this approach is that if someone attempts to front-run you then you have 24 hours to place a higher bid and secure your name.
Dynamic Pricing Algorithm
Another approach is to mimic the Bitcoin proof of work algorithm. Bitcoin aims to have one block produced every 10 minutes on average. Sometimes there may be 30 blocks in an hour and other times there may be none. If blocks are coming too frequently then Bitcoin increases the difficulty. If they are not coming fast enough then Bitcoin lowers the difficulty. The difficulty is simply the price to claim the right to produce the next block.
This same algorithm can be used to rate-limit the allocation of names without having an auction. Instead the price of names can be adjusted for every N names or every H hours. If the rate is above target then the price can increase. If the rate is below target then it can decrease.
The benefit of this algorithm is that if you want a name, you know the current price and you can grab it without delay! Furthermore, all available names are for sale at the same price at any given moment in time. Unfortunately, you can still be front-run. This approach gracefully handles short-term surges while preventing monopolization by squatters.
Hybrid Approach
You can use the dynamic pricing algorithm to establish the starting bid in an auction that ends exactly 24 hours later. You can get any name you like within 24 hours and no one can front-run anyone else.
A Political Approach
Under a political approach, you must first identify what “body of people” have the authority to grant private use of a name from the public namespace. The Eden on EOS community could be “granted” the power to arbitrate name allocation disputes. Once you have identified the community, now you must identify a process. This process could look something like:
- Anyone can request any name and propose a price to pay the community
- Votes are collected and if there are more “approve” than “reject” then the name is granted.
This process takes time, just like an auction. It can easily devolve into political parties where you must bribe the mob to get their vote. It can also easily succumb to voter apathy because most people just don’t care to pay attention. In order to be fair and sustainable, you would have to compensate everyone involved in reviewing and approving name allocations. This time and labor-intensive process could easily make names far more expensive than a pure market process.
Maybe Squatters Are not so Bad
Perhaps a community can benefit from squatters buying names so long as they keep the unused name on the market. The squatter keeps the name available and takes the risk that no buyer will ever come along. The community may not get the maximum possible price for an individual name, but it does get to sell more names at a lower price which could maximize community revenue.
Proposal for EOS Names & Symbols
A name or symbol can be “reserved” but not “consumed”. In other words, I can reserve the right to create the account “dantheman” without actually creating the account. Creating the account is expensive and once created cannot be deleated. Furthermore, transferring the account after creating it can be tricky. Token Symbol names face a similar challenge in that there are properties, such as precision, which are immutable once a symbol is fully claimed.
Transferring a “right to create” can be as simple as transferring an NFT. The fact that a “reserved” account or symbol name is more valuable than a “consumed” account or symbol name presents an interesting opportunity.
I propose we use the Hybrid Approach to reserve names; however, once a name is reserved the owner may choose to list it on the market or to convert it to an account. If they list it on the market then anyone can “buy it now” and the “squatter” keeps the profit.
With this approach you would still want to “rate-limit” name allocation, but you can error on the side of over-supplying the market and empowering name squatters to more easily make up the difference.
Political Subsidies
Many people will still complain that this process makes names or symbols too expensive for “poor” projects. Fortunately, there are many ways to petition the community for funds to cover the cost of buying the names and symbols you desire. By using market forces to establish value, the political process has a better understanding of the opportunity cost of giving a “poor” project a scarce name. There is no need to build a dedicated political process for allocating names if the political process can allocate the funds to buy the names.
在提供无缝用户体验的同时分配全球唯一名称是一项艰巨的挑战。当他们想要的名字被不使用它的人取走时，人们讨厌它。当有人廉价购买数千个名字然后试图以高价出售时，他们同样讨厌它。更糟糕的是，有人取了你几十年来一直使用的名字，一个你创造的有价值的名字，然后试图以高价卖给你。
分配名称有两种主要方式：经济上或政治上。当您从经济上定量分配名称时，抱怨是所有“好”名称都被采用并且非常昂贵。当您在政治上对名称进行定量分配时，您需要一个共识过程，这会成为社区冲突的潜在点。驾驭政治进程既不便宜也不容易。
无论如何，我们如何获得我们的名字？你要么向世界宣布你想被称为什么，要么世界选择如何称呼你。当两个人都想被称为同一事物时，这会产生冲突点。当“每个人都知道”正确的名称但以客观的方式证明“每个人都知道”是具有挑战性的时，也存在冲突。
在任何业务的早期，您都必须对名称的想法保密，直到您获得域名和社交媒体句柄。如果有人听到您只是在考虑的名称，那么他们可能会在尽可能多的平台上在您面前声明该名称，然后勒索您使用它。唯一的防御措施是在与任何人分享您的想法之前，抢先注册您认为可能使用的任何名称。这只会加剧好名字被“采用”但未使用和不可用的问题。
姓名分配系统的目标应该是尽可能多地提供姓名，同时降低有人抢占或抢占先机的风险。
所有的名字都是从“公地”开始的，域名抢注是公地悲剧的一个例子。短名称是稀缺的房地产，因为质量短名称的数量远远少于愿意使用它们的人和企业。当有人声称一个名字时，他们同时向其他人否认了这个名字。理想情况下，每个失去使用该名称的机会的人都应由获得该名称的人赔偿。域名抢注实际上是从公共公共空间盗窃，因为抢注者以便宜的价格购买名称，然后试图以公平的市场价格转售该名称。
域名抢注的解决方案是以尽可能接近公平市场价值的价格分配所有名称。这消除了擅自占地者的利润空间，并确保每个人都有平等的机会通过报销更广泛的社区来获得一个名字。不幸的是，这在希望以先到先得的方式以低廉的价格分配名称的人中并不受欢迎。
理论上，通过拍卖来发现一个名字作品的价格；但是，这假设所有未来的潜在买家都知道拍卖并准备参与。如果你试图同时拍卖所有可能的名字，那么绝大多数人会以不到一美分的价格卖给一个域名抢注者。这是因为在拍卖时，该名称的未来真实用户不在市场上。
为了防止域名抢注，分配名称的速率需要尽可能接近为合法（非抢注）目的而声称名称的“自然”速率。比实际需求更快地分配名称将压低价格并为擅自占地者创造机会。分配比实际需求慢的名称将推高价格并阻碍增长。
不幸的是，没有人知道名称分配的“自然”速率是多少，而且它不是恒定的。您可以在一周内获得大量新用户，然后一个月内一无所获。名称分配的静态速率限制可能会在激增期间阻碍采用，但仍会在缓慢时期提供抢注机会。
EOS 高级名称算法
EOS 网络试图通过拍卖高级名称来防止域名抢注。名字越短，越少见。短名称可用于创建名称空间，例如“.com”，企业可以购买短名称以分配具有相同结尾的所有名称。这允许 Anchor 钱包出售优质的“.gm”名称，而无需用户进行拍卖过程。
该算法的工作方式是每天最多可以出售一个高级名称，并且它必须是当前待定的所有高级名称中最昂贵的，并且必须保持 24 小时的头把交椅。如果发生竞标战，溢价名称分配速度可能会减慢并需要一周或更长时间。
许多人不喜欢这种算法，因为它需要不可预测的时间并且非常昂贵。从理论上讲，获得您想要的名字可能只需要 24 小时……如果您愿意支付比其他人更多的钱来排在队列的最前面。
这种方法的一个好处是，如果有人试图抢先你，那么你有 24 小时的时间提出更高的出价并确保你的名字。
动态定价算法
另一种方法是模仿比特币工作量证明算法。比特币的目标是平均每 10 分钟产生一个区块。有时一小时内可能有 30 个街区，有时可能没有。如果块来得太频繁，那么比特币会增加难度。如果他们来得不够快，那么比特币会降低难度。困难只是要求生产下一个区块的权利的价格。
相同的算法可用于限制名称的分配，而无需进行拍卖。相反，可以为每 N 个名称或每 H 小时调整名称的价格。如果利率高于目标，那么价格可能会上涨。如果利率低于目标，那么它可能会下降。
这种算法的好处是，如果你想要一个名字，你知道当前的价格，你可以毫不拖延地抓住它！此外，所有可用名称在任何给定时间都以相同的价格出售。不幸的是，你仍然可以领先。这种方法可以优雅地处理短期激增，同时防止擅自占地者垄断。
混合方法
您可以使用动态定价算法来确定恰好在 24 小时后结束的拍卖中的起拍价。您可以在 24 小时内获得您喜欢的任何名称，没有人可以抢先一步。
一种政治方法
在政治方法下，您必须首先确定哪些“人群”有权授予私人使用公共命名空间中的名称。Eden on EOS 社区可以被“授予”仲裁名称分配争议的权力。一旦您确定了社区，现在您必须确定一个流程。这个过程可能看起来像：
- 任何人都可以请求任何名称并提出支付社区的价格
- 投票被收集，如果“赞成”多于“拒绝”，则授予该名称。
这个过程需要时间，就像拍卖一样。它很容易演变成政党，你必须贿赂暴徒才能获得他们的选票。它也很容易屈服于选民的冷漠，因为大多数人根本不在乎关注。为了公平和可持续，您必须补偿参与审查和批准名称分配的每个人。这个时间和劳动密集型的过程很容易使名称比纯粹的市场过程贵得多。
也许擅自占地者并没有那么糟糕
也许一个社区可以从购买名称的擅自占地者中受益，只要他们将未使用的名称保留在市场上。擅自占地者保持名称可用，并冒着没有买家会出现的风险。社区可能无法为单个名称获得尽可能高的价格，但它确实可以以更低的价格出售更多名称，这可以最大化社区收入。
EOS 名称和符号提案
名称或符号可以“保留”但不能“使用”。换句话说，我可以保留创建帐户“dantheman”的权利，而无需实际创建帐户。创建帐户的成本很高，并且一旦创建就无法删除。此外，在创建帐户后转移帐户可能会很棘手。令牌符号名称面临类似的挑战，因为一旦完全声明符号，这些属性（例如精度）就是不可变的。
转让“创造权”可以像转让 NFT 一样简单。“保留”账户或交易品种名称比“消费”账户或交易品种名称更有价值这一事实提供了一个有趣的机会。
我建议我们使用混合方法来保留名称；但是，一旦名称被保留，所有者可以选择将其上市或将其转换为帐户。如果他们在市场上上市，那么任何人都可以“立即购买”，而“擅自占地者”则保留了利润。
使用这种方法，您仍然希望“限制”名称分配，但您可能会在市场供过于求和授权域名抢注者更轻松地弥补差异方面犯错。
政治补贴
许多人仍然会抱怨这个过程使得名称或符号对于“糟糕”的项目来说过于昂贵。幸运的是，有很多方法可以向社区请求资金来支付购买您想要的名称和符号的费用。通过使用市场力量来建立价值，政治进程可以更好地理解给“穷”项目起稀缺名称的机会成本。如果政治程序可以分配资金购买名称，则无需建立专门的政治程序来分配名称。